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  Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers

50th (Northumbrian) Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers Brigade Signals Officer Albert Edward Odell MC+Bar. Officer commanding No 1 Section. Picture circa 1917 'Arras' (Below)

50th (Northumbrian) Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers MORE DETAILS ON THIS UNIT Artillery Signal and Cable Sections - July 1918 (Below)

Note: My thanks go to Paul Williams, whose Grandfather John Rees Williams is in the above picture 5th from the left Go To Web page on John Rees Williams

Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers

I will try here to give some more detail information about the role of a Signaller during the Great War.

(Based heavily on my research into the above officer,  plus a signallers notebook that I have in my possession, taken from lectures at Aldershot on or after 18th Jan 1917, plus  'The Signal Service France' by R.E. Priestly that is an excellent reference work for those who wish to read more)

The Role of the Signal Service.

In all warfare, a great emphasis is placed on communication, and during the Great War, this requirement to be in touch with all parts of an attacking force, plus the artillery, had never been so acute.

Telephony was still in its infancy, but much reliance was placed on this new innovation.

Brassard: A signaller went to war wearing the distinctive blue/white armband. Signallers often wore the divisional sign sewn into the centre.

51st (Highland) Div Sig Coy.  R.E.       

         

15th (Scottish) Div Sig Coy.  R.E.                                     57th (West Lancashire) Div Sig Coy. R.E.         14th (Light) Div Sig Coy. R.E.

Plus they wore a signal patch on their sleeve

Overview

To obtain a picture of the forward signal system, it is necessary first to visualise for the eyes of the imagination a more or less irregular grid of heavy cable routes securely buried from any single direct hit of a shell of any size less than 8-inch. At frequent intervals the cables are connected through securely protected dug-outs by means of elaborate cross-connecting frames which are equipped with plug and socket boards, terminals and cross-connecting wires, or  any other of a dozen devices which might be the particular fancy of the local senior signal officer. At most of the dug-outs and test points two, three, or more pairs are led up out of the bury and fixed to accessible but protected stakes and boards for the benefit of units whose headquarters are situated in the immediate neighbourhood. At the principal junction points the dug-outs are more commodious, and here, in a kind of warren more or less adequate to their needs, live the maintenance personnel under the charge of a junior N.C.O. or senior Sapper.

Click to see larger picture

A captured German Command post at La Baraque, near the Riqueval Bridge on the St Quentin Canal. Captured by the 1/5th South Staffords on the 3rd October 1918, it was pressed into service as a Signal Office.  Notice the sign above the door, telephones stacked outside, and the hastily laid wires running out of the door and over the roof.

Certain other dug-outs are manned only during operations. At all, whether manned or not, are notices to the effect that unorthorized persons must not tamper with the lines. At all, also, are diagrams, perhaps only of the immediate connections, perhaps also of the general Corps system. All diagrams are kept up to date and the N.C.O. or sapper in charge at each station is informed daily as to alterations and instructed as to the allotment of his lines.

Finally at the principal test station lives the area officer himself in constant communication with his A.D.Signals and the "Lines" officers of his Corps and the Divisions occupying the area for which he is responsible. His books are a compendium of the history and present state of the bury. He should know every detail of its history and the exact state of efficiency of every pair. He should patrol every inch of his bury at frequent intervals to ensure that his maintenance personnel is keeping the routes  in perfect order and repairing daily the ravages made by enemy shells.

When lines were continually broken, as often happened forward of cable head, other means were employed. Other means must, indeed, always be available from Divisional headquarters forward and especially on a Brigade forward signal route. The least technical of the means employed were runners, dispatch riders, pigeons, and messenger dogs; slightly more technical were visual, aeroplane signalling, Very lights and S.O.S. rockets. Most technical of all, and therefore the source of most trouble to the unspecialised forward personnel, were the wireless and earth induction sets.

A Mounted Signaller William Bryce

This is a picture of my father, William Bryce, Royal Engineers. He told me that he served in Belgium and acted as a calveryman, a sniper, a motercycle despatch rider, and as a signalman.  The sword-like tool hanging from his saddle was used to check communication lines.  It has his initials on it and the stripes denoting signaling equipment.

Bill Bryce, Roberts Creek, BC. Canada

 

Pigeons

On 11th September 1914,  15 Pigeons were handed over to British intelligence by the French. These birds were used for intelligence purposes only,  but from this small beginning was destined to grow a great   branch of the Signal Service which in 1918 numbered 20,000 birds with a personnel of some 380 experts. No less than 90,000 men had been trained to care for and fly Pigeons. The Pigeoneers  went over the top with Pigeons in 'Assault Baskets',  ready to carry important messages back to HQ.

    

 

R.E. Signaller with Pigeon Assault Basket

There were Divisional mobile Pigeon lofts, that kept the supply of Pigeons up to strength. The value of Pigeons had been so demonstrated during stationary warfare that the service had reached very important figures. In one Corps alone, in the Second Army offensive of June, 1917, 532 birds were issued on a single day and 92 operation messages received back. The approximate number of Pigeons in use during the offensive on the Somme in 1917 was 12,000 birds.

     

Pigeons being transported to the Front by Dispatch Rider.

Times were also much improved, averaging 25 minutes for a message from the front line to the formation headquarters for which it was intended. The speed of the pigeon remained constant, but delivery was hastened by constant attention to the minutest points of organisation of the forward service and particularly of the means of despatching the messages from the loft to headquarters.

Casualties to Pigeons were comparatively high during the battles and in the German offensive on the Belgian coast a mobile loft was hit by a shell and destroyed. At the battle of Messines, also, quite ten per cent. of the birds in action were killed, over 50 being destroyed by a shell which made a direct hit upon a distributing station. On the other hand, their value was demonstrated again and again and the demand was still in excess of the supply. Several hundred messages were passed by this means in every battle, and a reflection of the efficiency and utility of the service was seen in July, 1917,  when a further increase of establishment to 120 horse-drawn lofts and six motor mobile lofts was authorised.

Pigeon being released from an early Tank

Novel features of the employment  of the birds in this year were their use by artillery officers for observation purposes, and by the crews of tanks. An unusual incident of training occurred when, in preparation for a coast offensive which never materialised, motor despatch boats were allotted for training a proportion of the birds out to sea.

The pigeon service at this period of the war had far outstripped the forward wireless service in its practical utility. No better example of the mutability of the fortunes of the various branches of the Signal Service can, however, be seen, than the reversal in the importance of these two methods of signalling which took place in the following year.

Dogs

Signal Dogs in use at the Front

The use of messenger dogs in the British Army is an interesting instance of the evolution of an entirely new method of forward signalling to meet a particular type of warfare. In September, 1917, definite information was received from German prisoners of the utilisation of these animals for message-carrying purposes,  and it was rather earlier than this - in  the Messines offensive - that the first experiments with "liaison dogs," as they were called, was carried out by an artillery commander.

WW1 German dog message carrier/harness. (on display in Perronne Musee De l'armee)

These initial ventures were so successful that the project was  taken up officially and a War Dog School was formed at Shoeburyness under an officer who had long made a hobby and business of training dogs for war purposes and who was an acknowledged expert on this subject. At first the employment of the dogs was permitted to depend on the will of the individual units who expressed a desire to have them as an extra means of communication, but this haphazard organisation could not long survive. The relations between the human and the canine species,  though very gratifying from the point of view of civilisation, were too amicable for the best results to be obtained without great insistence upon dog discipline. The tendency to make pets of the animals, and the lack of appreciation both of their capabilities and of their limitations, much decreased the value of the dogs as a reliable means of  liaison. Orders were therefore issued in November, 1917,  for the centralisation of the messenger dog service under the O.C. Carrier Pigeon Service as the senior representative of the most nearly allied branch of the Signal Service.   The messenger dogs already with units in the field were withdrawn to a central kennel at Etaples, re-sorted and re-trained. Sectional kennels were then formed at certain Corps headquarters and the messenger dog service re-started on a regular basis. The animals were speedy - averaging in one Division a mile in seven minutes -  but their eyes were badly affected by gas and they were reported as somewhat unreliable under heavy shelling. On the other hand they frequently did valuable service in situations where runners would have been exposed to great risk. They had two advantages over pigeons; they could be used at night, and their training to a new area took one week only as opposed to the three or four weeks necessary to habituate pigeons to a new district.

    

Dog message carrier                                                          Dogs being trained to jump Barbed Wire

Dog Gas Mask

Runners

Runners as in 1916, were the last resource of the forward commander and his signal officer. Their use was limited by the need for the economy of personnel, by the heavy casualties amongst their ranks, and by the slowness of this method of conveying information. Forward of battalion headquarters, however, runners - and possibly visual were the only reliable means of signalling in anything approaching moving warfare. In the very forward areas, runners held their own throughout, and they often formed a valuable adjunct to the Brigade forward route. Wherever feasible, other means were employed and the signal officer who was reduced to the use of runners only, was compelled to confess to himself that for the time being he was a failure. His main preoccupation in such a situation was to organise some alternative means and take as many of his runners as possible off the route as quickly as he could.

Visual

Visual, generally, was much employed, using heliograph, (use of the Sun and mirrors) but all other methods paled into insignificance beside the efficiency of the Lucas lamp. Flags were little used, discs were used only by very forward units, and by these less than in 1916, other types of lamps other than the Lucas were practically obsolescent, and   were superseded as fast as the Lucas lamps came to hand. Very lights and rockets were laid down as part of the equipment of the normal Brigade forward party and were specially useful for the purpose of notifying sudden emergencies and for showing up the position of the front line and of particular posts. They were used also, as in the previous year for acknowledging the receipt of visual messages.

Signallers of the 5th (Irish) Lancers, setting up a Heliograph. (Flags can also be seen on the ground)           circa. 1906

One special feature of the use of visual was the greater prevalence of two -way working. This was made possible by the smothering of enemy observation stations by the British artillery fire and by the depth of the advances. Another innovation was the use of the pill-boxes in the Ypres district as the sites of visual stations. These little fortresses had deep embrasures and doors which still further decreased the dispersion of the rays of the Lucas lams. Two-way working in the very face of the enemy was possible in many cases by judicious use of suitable posts.

 

Organisation

As per the above diagram, each signal section had a responsibility for a particular section of the communication route, between Army HQ and Company level.

The Divisional Headquarters Signallers looked after communications for lateral to flanking Divisions and signalling work at GHQ Divisional  Headquarters.

The Brigade Signals Officer for instance (No1 Section), held responsibility for the sections of line from his  Brigade Headquarters, to each of the other three Brigades.

The Regimental Signallers took the line on to Company level.

New lines were, however, usually laid by The Divisional Company, but maintained by the Regimental Signallers in their respective areas.

Position Warfare

Brigade signals in position warfare consisted mainly in the manning of the Brigade signal office, the giving of assistance with the forward portions of the Divisional lines, and the maintenance of  trench cable and alternative wireless, power buzzer, and visual, to battalions and flank Brigades. The Brigade section is one of the few signal units which remained practically unchanged throughout the war. Both the Brigade and the battalion signal section shared in the prevalent shifting forward of technical qualifications towards the front line. The battalion signaller of 1914 knew visual only--both Morse and semaphore--but nothing else. Telephones, if they existed at all, were unofficial. The height of position warfare in 1917 and 1918 saw battalion signallers blasé as regards lines and the common "D3" buzzer; versed in the mysteries of the fullerphone; and familiar with the highly-technical power buzzer and loop wireless set. In addition he was required to know how to handle pigeons, how to fire message-carrying rockets and how to use small buzzer exchanges. This needs to be born in mind when considering the evolution of forward signals, for it was one of the chief difficulties encountered in replacing casualties amongst battalion signallers.

It was impossible for the Brigade section, unchanged in numbers as it was, to keep efficient a normal Brigade signal system in the position battles. This was legislated for by the formation of the Brigade pool of battalion signallers. These men were specially trained to enable them to work the more technical alternative methods of forward signalling and were controlled by the Brigade signal officer. This fact helped make possible, the concentration of signal activities along one main route down the centre of each Brigade area.

On a "peaceful" front in normal times the brigade signal office would be connected by sounder or fullerphone and by telephones with Division; by telephone and fullerphone with each battalion and with lateral Brigades. As far as possible, lines would be accommodated in the buried system. Where this was not possible,  trench cable would be used. Forward of battalion headquarters, an emergency line system would be laid and connected up to "D3" telephones or fullerphones at company headquarters or the more important posts. It would be reinforced by as complete a system of visual stations as was possible. In addition would be power buzzer and amplifier stations at most Brigade and some battalion headquarters and power buzzers at important company headquarters or at posts particularly likely to be cut off by shell fire or a sudden attack. At battalion headquarters and in each company area would be pigeon posts;normal routine traffic which had no particular urgency and yet could not be passed by telephone was sent by runner. Buzzer was strictly prohibited forward of Brigade headquarters.

Offensives

This normal Divisional intercommunication system was, of course, modified considerably during offensives. In three ways in particular,  distinct advantages from the policy and practice of the previous year can be seen. These three were:-

• The pushing forward of the buried system across "No Man's Land."
• The adoption of the single Brigade line of signal communications and the formation of Brigade forward parties.
• The success of the power buzzer and amplifier and the initial use of loop wireless sets, and continuous wave wireless for use with the artillery.

In the position battles of 1916, no attempt was made as an ordered policy to push forward the buried cable immediately after zero. Two considerations militated against the adoption of such a policy, the first being the shortage of labour, the second, the casualties which would certainly be inflicted on the working parties by the enemy's barrage. In 1917 both considerations were over-ruled and in some cases the buried cable system was pushed forward well into the captured zone within a few hours of the commencement of the action. The best examples occurred in the advances opposite Arras and in the battle for Vimy Ridge. Here, circumstances were particularly favourable, and on one occasion a short bury of 60 yards only had to be dug to connect up the British mined cable head with  the extensive tunnels on the German side of the line. In such circumstances, the best results might be expected, but even without the use of such adventitious tunnels good work was done in pushing forward normal buries. One Corps reported the completion of 1,500 yards within 15 hours of zero, and a further 1000 yards by zero plus 31 hours.

The depth of the advance was a powerful determining factor. It was useless attempting to keep up with a deep advance by means of buried cable. Signal communication was required at once and must be extended forward by the most rapid and not by the slowest existing means. Fortunately, such deep advances implied relatively little enemy retaliation. In such a case it was therefore possible to follow up the advancing troops with poled cable and airline routes. Thus, for brief periods, comic airline and poled or treed cable crept up once more into Divisional areas. Once the overground system was completed and working, a portion of the outdoor signal personnel was told off to maintain it, while the remainder, with the assistance of what working parties could be spared, worked steadily on the extension of the buried system.

Cable Wagon

   

This 1918 Cable wagon is preserved in the Royal Signals Museum at Blandford Camp, please let me know if you know of another existing elsewhere.

Cable laying hand Cart

(Royal Signals Museum)

Lines of Communication

In addition, further up the tree, each Army had its own version on the G.P.O.  The 'L' Signal Battalion. They did not come under Divisional command, but laid hundreds of miles of telephone wires, between Armies and Divisions, and interfaced the B.E.F. with the existing French infrastructure. A thankless and largely unrecorded job. George Odell,   Bert Odell's brother was one of these men, serving as a Lieutenant in the No5 Telegraph Construction Company. 'L' Signals Battalion.

This was also a time of experimentation with the new wireless communication, but the equipment was still cumbersome and difficult to install. Odell made the comment in one of his letters, that the wireless sets were too far back into safety to be of any practical use, and that far more should be made of these installations.

One continuos problem encountered by Signal Companies  was moving. At each location that a Division found itself, the Signallers had to aquaint themselves with the telephone network, its location and inherent faults. They even had to replace the equipment in the various exchanges with their own as they took over from the departing Division. All this was most labour intensive,  each move entailed an advance party of signallers to prepare the way and ensure that the Division remained in communication at all times. The dislike of exchanging instruments, probably of a quite different type was understandable. The disadvantages of the relief procedure in existence were certainly obvious, though acquiesced in by everyone concerned.  In Brigades particularly, and in Divisions to a great extent, moves were frequent, and the instrument repairers spent a considerable portion of their time in the signal office either installing, improving, or taking down the instruments on completion of a relief which had just taken place, or in preparation for a relief to come. Work thus proceeded under disadvantages, yet the custom persisted. Even in 1918, it was the exception rather than the rule for a Division to hand over its instruments in position to the incoming Division, though this was often done with test-panels, and, less commonly, with telephone exchanges. Perhaps the motive at the root of this policy of constant change was a low opinion of human nature; perhaps an affection for instruments that had been in use for many months. Whatever was the cause, it was one which might well receive the attention of future signal officers.

In addition, each signal office was an extremely busy place, thousands of messages were handled too and fro by the signallers, who were required to man the phones and 'Buzzers' 24 hours a day, in case of attack. They worked long hours in shifts, in addition to being out sometimes all night mending breaks in the wires, or digging in new routes, often a muddy and dangerous job. The  Signal Companies were working almost continuously, where perhaps the individual Battalions would  periodically be at rest during their time out of the line. The signallers would be working flat out repairing shell   damage,  improving the network, and preparing for the next move.

Officers, generally were putting in the same hours, taking responsibility for all the work,  supervising the offices during the day, the rations, equipment, and out during the night directing working parties etc.

The German advances of 1918

To the south the situation was grave, and at one time it looked as if retreat might become general and far-reaching. Here the Signal Service was faced with new experiences and suffered heavy casualties. Following a whirlwind bombardment, masses of the enemy surprised the British front line posts and, passing over them in their stride, and without serious interruption to the speed of their advance, penetrated deeply and rapidly towards Divisional Headquarters. Forward lines were cut in in all directions, and at one time the fate of the Brigade and Divisional headquarters of more than one Division was in doubt. The forward signal system was perforce abandoned to the Germans and the rear system was largely destroyed with one significant exception.

The exception which proved the salvation of the situation was a two-pair emergency route of armoured cable which had been laid through Gouzeaucourt by a Division as an alternative to the multicore cable route provided for it by the Corps. This route providentially remained uncut throughout the operations and became the main channel of communication for no less than three Divisions. It was over this cable--at that time partly in the area occupied by the advancing German infantry--that messages passed which appraised the Corps of the urgency of the situation, and resulted eventually in the counter-attack by the Guards Division which restored the situation. On no single occasion during the whole war, was the value of an alternative route demonstrated in such a striking manner. The line passed in and out of German hands, but was overlooked by the enemy and remained through for two critical days.

By the date of the German counter-attack the pigeon service had been largely reconstituted, but the 29th was misty and the birds were much hampered in their flight by fog. Many were away for several hours and the situation was complicated on the most critical portion of the front by the necessity of withdrawing a loft to prevent its capture by the enemy who had already overrun the headquarters of one division. Visual was also interfered with to a great extent by the same mist, and the weather conditions on part of the front included a snowfall which made it difficult to locate breaks in the lines.

The alternative method which was most useful was wireless .  The aerials of the Brigade stations were shot away, but were re-erected, again and again and urgent messages dealt with in considerable numbers. In the emergency, code and cipher regulations were to a great extent swept away. Extra wireless stations were rushed up to the supposed locality of missing Brigades and by this means the signal system was largely reconstructed without the use of lines, which were, however, laid as soon as correct locations were obtained.

One interesting aspect of the situation as it affected signals was the absorption of a large section of the signals personnel into the firing line where they shared the fortunes of their infantry comrades. A particular instance which is deserving of record is that of a forward wireless station serving a battalion headquarters which was surrounded by the enemy. One of the operators remained in the dug-out to destroy the apparatus, the remaining two took their rifles and helped to man an adjoining trench. One was killed and one was captured. The third man, having thoroughly destroyed his station, joined the infantry and retreated with them fighting a rearguard action for 24 hours. He remained with them until the company was relieved, when he proceeded to join the signal company to which he belonged. It was such emergencies, occurring from time to time, which gave Signal Service personnel an opportunity of showing that they possessed the same qualities in action as the men of other fighting branches of the Army. the maintaining of lines under shell fire, the reckless riding of motor cycles over crowded slippery roads, the manning of insufficiently protected visual stations or signal offices, all called for courage of a high order. None had, however, the same effect of drawing the Signal Service nearer in sympathy to the infantry as such isolated instances when the wearers of the blue and white armbands threw aside their technical instruments and took up rifle and bomb to do their share of direct damage to a triumphant enemy. It is to the credit of the Signal Service that similar instances can be quoted wherever the opportunity of such action occurred.

The contribution by these men to our ultimate success, cannot now be estimated, but their efforts have perhaps, barely been recognised in subsequent years. All the glory (if indeed that was what it was) went to the fighting battalions, but without the backbone of the Signal Companies, many heroic actions would have failed miserably, and the history books would now tell a very different story.

Equipment Links

Power Buzzer and Amplifier

Wireless

The Fullerphone

Field Exchanges

Trench Telephones

D mk 111

C mk 1 + C mk 2

Miscellaneous other equipment

Signals Equipment, see and learn about Great War telephony

                               

Sapper Arthur Halestrap I recently had the honour of meeting Sapper Arthur Halestrap. At 103 years he is a veteran of the 46th (South Midland) Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers, and went to France as a wireless operator during 1918. He recently stood up and gave an entertaining talk about his wartime experiences to the Northampton branch of the Western Front Association. A delightful gentleman, who had the whole room in fits of laughter on more than one occasion. Click to view image

 

Humour Humour was a part of every day life in the Army in the Great War, this piece from 'SOMEWHERE' by Sapper Robert Hall, (A Signaller) illustrates this well: THE RABBIT PIE. On Sunday we had the biggest joke we have employed, and it was all over a rabbit pie. There was one sapper who very frequently has his dinner in the town instead of with us. He won't eat any army rations unless he is obliged, and he visited all the estaminets in turn till he found a good and cheap one, and there he dines on his own. Well, one day last week he came back and told us he had had rabbit pie. He describes its beauties till our mouths watered, and someone asked him if the estaminet would bake a pie big enough for three of them, and send it up to the billet. This was eventually arranged, and the pie arrived on Saturday evening, ready for Sunday's dinner. A great deal of jealousy arose, and the three proprietors assumed very superior airs. It was then that a most disgraceful plot was engineered. All sorts of statements were volunteered as to what French cooks really put in rabbit pies, and one man gave a gruesome description of the pies baked during the siege of Paris, but the three intending diners were not to be frightened off. "You can say what you like," said one of the trio, "but you won't choke us off." "I don't care if they don't put rabbits in at all. The French are splendid cooks, at any rate," said the second. "I'd eat it if was made from 'Micheal O'Leary,' and shouldn't know any better," chimed the third. (Micheal O'Leary is the headquarters fox terrier puppy.) "Well," said someone reflectively, "its a jolly funny thing, but talking of Mike, I haven't seen him today." "I saw him last night," said another,   "and when I come to think of it, he was in that same shop with a dispatch rider who was buying sausages." "Oh don't act the goat," said one of the pie proprietors. "You're only wild because we are going to have rabbit pie and you've only got 'bully beef.' But you can't get an invitation--there's not enough to go round." The strange part of it all was that Micheal really had disappeared. And early on Sunday morning I was initiated with several others into the mystery of his disappearance. We were taken to a secret hiding-place some distance from the skittle alley, where a disgusted fox terrier was expressing his indignation at being securely tied up. Then we turned to go to work, and on the way went to the cook-house, where, reposing on a shelf, crisp and brown, was the famous pie, waiting to be warmed in the oven for dinner. We took a hasty look all round to see that there was no one about; a knife was produced, the crust lifted, and something dropped in. Then we hurried guiltily away. At dinner the conversation all turned on the puppy's mysterious disappearance, and various theories were advanced, each one terminating at the pie shop, until the pie was produced, hot and steaming. the three gathered round with expectant faces; we crowded over their shoulders as the carver stuck his fork in, and began to cut the crust. The knife hit something and could go no further. "A bone," said the carver, and lifted the crust--and there, nestling among the gravy and the joints, was a dog-collar! "D------d if they haven't cooked old Mike after all!" exclaimed a horrified sapper; and seizing a fork, he lifted out the collar and read the inscription aloud: "Micheal O'Leary, Headquarters. . . " All of us dined on bully that day, and the pie was buried with full military honours. Mike was reincarnated shortly afterwards; and now , if you want a good old rough-and-tumble scrap, you have only to ask any one of the three what he has got for dinner.

   'Wanted' Great War Signals Equipment: please e mail me

LINKS

  Click here for  7th NFshort history of the Regiment,  see personalities and links to detailed accounts of important actions.

Click here for Captain Francis Buckley   7th N.F. He edited the official history

Click here for   Captain Bert Odell MC + Bar  149th Brigade Signaller, No 1 Section, 50th (Northumbrian) Divisional Signal Company R.E

Signals Equipment, see and learn about Great War telephony

Read about Major R.E. Priestley who wrote 'the Signal Service France (1919)

Great War Picture Gallery

 

Can you add to this story? Please send me your pictures or stories of Signallers in the Great War. Privates or Officers, named or not.   Gavin Purdon has written with the following account of his Grandfather, from the 2nd Kings Own Scottish Borderers: Robert Murray Purdon MM

 

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Guy Smith     e mail:    guy@trenchmap.com