REPORT ON OPERATIONS ON THE NIGHT
OF 13/14th MARCH-1917
46th (North Midland) Division,
137th Inf Brig, 1/5 South Staffordshire Regiment.
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The Battalion paraded at SOUASTRE at
6-0pm, and proceeded to walk to the taped jumping off point, a distance of some five
miles. It was pouring with rain, and the road was blocked with every kind of transport
stuck in the mud due to the condition of the roads. They were blocked for nearly an hour
at FONQUENVILLERS, and it was nearly 10-0pm before they reached ROSSIGNOL WOOD. There was
a short halt, but not long enough to give the men any tea, and BIEZ WOOD was not reached
until 12 midnight. It was impossible to get there before, as they were in the rear of
other troops.
The men were extended in waves on the
taped out line, a barrage was put on the front line German trench at 1-0am, and orders
were given to advance at 1-0am whether properly extended or not, because of
co-operating with the 7th Div and the 1/5 North Stafford Regt. At 1-0am the battalion
advanced to the attack in waves, those in rear being sorted out on the move.
It was raining, the night was
exceptionally dark, and the ground very heavy. The wire was found to be dense and
impenetrable. The enemy's artillery fire was intense, and his machine guns active
throughout the operation.
The RADFEHRER GRABEN proved a bad
obstacle, and touch was lost between the flanks of the right and centre companies. All
lines reached the German wire and there were practically no casualties. At this
point the whole was checked by the German wire. At some points the first, and at others
the first and second belts were cut, but at no point was it possible to penetrate
the German positions without cutting.
At a point about L2 a 50.00 behind
RADFEHRER GRABEN the wire was swept by cross fire from machine guns. A large number of
casualties were caused by Officers and N.C.O.s looking for gaps in this area. These
machine guns were reported firing from behind the parados from the flanks, men having to
bunch to get through the gaps in the outer wire, or gaps cut in the second belt. One gap
in the third belt of wire, which ran up to the German parapet was cut by one
of our Lewis guns. Another Lewis gun got onto the German parapet, and engaged two machine
guns firing from the right flank somewhere in RADFEHRER GRABEN behind the front line. One
gun was silenced entirely and another temporarily ceased fire.
Small parties of men succeeded in
obtaining a foothold in the German trench, but this took some considerable time owing to
lack of touch being kept- they were forced back by advancing Germans from direction of 2nd
line, and lack of support.
4 Officers and 10 N.C.O.s were knocked out during the early
stages, and this accounts for a certain amount of disorganisation. The men of
this Company remained outside the German wire and withdrew at daylight.
The trenches seemed in fair
condition, except near LONG SAP at L 2 b
0. 5 where the front line was filled with wire. I can give no
information regarding the 2nd line, although the Company Commander is known to have
advanced in that direction, but no-one came back.
The centre Company found 1st and 2nd
belts of wire fairly well cut - the 3rd belt practically uncut. In some places only two
belts exist. They cut two gaps by hand.
2nd Lt Frost and about 30 men gained
a foothold in German trench about 100 yds north of BIG SAP. He sent off one party to gain
touch with "A" Company on our right, and proceeded to reconnoitre. He opened
fire over the parados at some Germans moving in his front, probably near the second line.
One of his Lewis guns engaged and
silenced the enemy's Machine-gun firing from communication trench about German 2nd line in
rear of the LONG SAP.
Corpl Hallum forced his way in
another place about 30 yds N. of 2nd Lt Frost. Both these parties were eventually bombed
out and were unable to hold on owing to lack of bombs.
All the officers (except 2/Lt Frost)
and 13 N.C.O.'s were knocked out by bomb
and machine gun fire. The trench is reported to be very much broken up behind LONG
SAP and point 00 by our shell fire, machine guns caused them no trouble when wire belt had
been penetrated.
2nd Lt Frost re organised the Company
in a sunken road about 60 yds from the German wire, and remained at this point for about 2
hours, when recalled by me at daybreak. He states that RADFEHRER GRABEN caused some
confusion and bunching up during the advance. "No-Mans land is somewhat heavy and
some-what broken with shell holes.
The left Company, in waves, advanced
on its objective. Our left platoon got mixed up with the 1/5 North Staffords.
No gaps were found but the bulk of
the Company got into the trench without opposition.
The two reserve platoons advanced
through the leading wave as ordered, and moving over the top seized and blocked the
enemy's trenches at points F 26 d 50 . 40 - F 26 d
70. 35 and F 26 d 70 . 20 and established a support at F 26
d 60 . 22 as was previously ordered. On the way they bombed the German machine
gun at point L 2 b 10 . 90 - this gun was carried into dug-out which was
also bombed.
Work of consolidation was proceeded
with, although the Germans counter attacked from direction of their supposed second line
about point L 2 b 30 . 80.
This Company seems to have done
everything it was ordered to do.
The posts in advance round point 63
were attacked by a small party from direction of BUCQUOY, and having used all their
bombs on dug-outs, and at the same time observing that the troops on their left had not
penetrated to the Germans second line, they fell back in good order. This company
was then occupying about 100 yds of the German trench without anyone on their right or
left, and they were without any bombs or means of obtaining them.
They then retired into RETTEMOY
GRABEN and consolidated close up to the German wire, and from this point they were
recalled by me at dawn.
Their losses were slight, in
comparison to the more unsuccessful attempts of the companies on the right, Officers 3, N.C.O.'s 14.
They report to have bombed several
dug-outs, but it is difficult to locate these with any accuracy. One dug-out was east of
point 63. - another near point 00. They report a good gap N. of the Battalion frontage
about F 26 c 80 . 12. Trenches all round this area were badly knocked about,
the bottoms full of mud and fresh earth. The Germans do not appear to have shown any sign
of great strength on our left, but their bombing parties were very active from the support
line. Our advanced parties could see the Germans throwing bombs at the North Staffs; from
behind the parados in their second line.
Men of these parties, state they,
took two German prisoners and escorted them to FONQUENVILLERS together with five prisoners
taken by 1/5 North Staffords. They did not bring them to Bn Headquarters, and I have no
means of verifying the above statement except from the men themselves.
I collected the men in Stafford
trench between BIEZ WOOD and SQUARE WOOD about 6-30 am. About this time I met Colonel
Trump. 1/6th South Staffordshire Regt, who had brought me reinforcements and orders to
clear up the situation. It was then daylight, and I did not think it advisable without
deliberation and preparation to again attack.
I attribute the failure of the attack
to:-
1. Strength of the enemy's
wire.
2. Dis-organisation owing to
heavy Officer and N.C.O. casualties
- darkness and ignorance of the ground.
3. Lack of bombs.
4. Difficulties in
communication.
Lieut-Colonel.
(Sgd) J.M. Llewellyn
15/3/1917. Commdg 1/5
South Staffordshire Regiment.
